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Abstract—Secure time synchronization is a key requirement for many sophisticated application running on these networks.
Most of the existing secure time synchronization protocols incur high communication and storage costs and are subject to a
few known security attacks. In wireless sensor network (WSN), lifetime of the network is determined by the amount of
energy consumption by the nodes. To improve the lifetime of the network, nodes are organized into clusters, in which the
cluster head (CH) collects and aggregates the data. A special node called mobile data collector (MDC) is used to collect the
data from the CH and transfer it to the base station (BS) By using proposed method MDC authenticated to CH by
computing shared secret keys on the fly. Once the MDC and CH are authenticated, all the sensor nodes in the cluster are
synchronized, time synchronization reduce the communication and storage requirements of each CH. Security analysis of
this proposed system shows that it is highly robust against different attacks namely compromised CH, reply attack, message
manipulation attack as well as pulse delay attack.
keywords— Cluster Head, Mobile Data Collector, Message Authentication Code, Secure Data Collection, Time
Synchronization.

are several prototype implementations, such as RBS
[3], TPSN [4], FTSP [5] that can achieve
microseconds accuracy, none of the existing
protocols are resilient to malicious attacks. These
protocols have not been built with security in mind.
Realizing the inadequacy of existing time
synchronization solutions, we develop schemes for
achieving secure time synchronization using mobile
data collectors in clustered wireless sensor network.
In majority of the applications sensed data is
aggregated by sensors called cluster heads and sent to
base station for analysis. Sending data directly to base
station will waste energy at intermediate sensors and
it increase delay so to overcome from these problem
notion of mobile nodes is introduced in WSN[6]. The
approach uses mobile data collection agents [6]. The
mobile agent, called a Mobile Data Collector (MDC)
traverse in the network and collects the data from the
nodes and dumps the data back at BS. These MDC’s
can also help in data aggregation. The use of MDC
for data collection in clustered WSN is depicted in
Fig1.
In this paper we are proposed a secure time
synchronization protocol using MDC. By using
proposed method MDC authenticated to CH by
computing shared secret keys on the fly. Once the
MDC and CH are authenticated, all the sensor nodes
in the cluster are synchronized, after time
synchronization CH transfer aggregated data to
MDC. Time synchronization prevents external
attackers from successfully modifying any values in
synchronization pulse or in acknowledgement packet,
finally show that this protocol is resilient to attacks
from external attacker as well as to attacks from a
compromised MDC.

I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor Networks (WSN) comprised mainly
of small sensor nodes with limited resources and a
base station. The nodes in a network are deployed
over a geographic area to sense and gather various
types of data that includes temperature, humidity,
intrusion detection, vehicular motion and so on [1].
Time synchronization is critical to sensor networks at
many layers of its design. It enables better dutycycling of the radio, accurate and secure localization,
beam forming and other
collaborative signal
processing.
Main goal of time synchronization is to provide a
common notion of time for a group of nodes in the
network. Different applications pose different
accuracy requirements, but in any case
synchronization should be performed with as small
overhead as possible to achieve the required
accuracy. Synchronization in wireless sensor network
is vital aspect of successful and efficient network
operations in any business settings, particularly in
military and medical applications as they latter rely
on the data accuracy to make rapid and sound
decision. Imagine the detrimental affect on the
functionality of all these application if a malicious
adversary is able to abuse the underlying time
synchronization protocol. Nodes will have faulty
estimates about the location of the other cluster
nodes. This can further trigger unnecessary packet
retransmission if MAC layer acknowledgements are
enabled. It will trivial for adversaries to perform reply
attacks.
The time synchronization problem has been
thoroughly studied in sensor networks [2] and there
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is to sense the environment and transmit the acquired
information to base stations for further processing
with secure time information. Several recent
contributions to the literature have addressed security
and privacy issues in sensor networks [9]-[11] for
routing, but it is difficult to implement along with
existing time synchronization approaches because
they require lots of computations for routing. Thus,
the existing time synchronization schemes in sensor
networks were not designed with security in mind,
thus leaving them vulnerable to security attacks in
addition to establishing the need of secure time
synchronization for individual sensor nodes.
Security in RBS[5] Scheme is vulnerable and it is
prone to many attacks [10]. Adding a sequence
number to beacon messages or other messages will
prevent message replay attacks. RBS works by
receiver to receiver synchronization in which both
nodes receive the reference beacon and then calculate
their offset with one another. An attack would be as
simple as compromising one of the nodes with an
incorrect time. The non compromised node will then
calculate an incorrect offset during the exchange
period.
TPSN[6] is a sender to receiver tree based protocol
with two phases, the level discovery phase and the
synchronization phase. Both of the phases are initiated
by the root node. In the synchronization phase the
level number and the time are both sent through the
tree. An attack would simply be to compromise a nonroot node with the incorrect time. This will propagate
through the tree and the closer the compromised node
is to the root node, the more incorrect synchronization
will occur. Also a node could lie about its level. That
would cause other nodes to request synchronization
information in which it could give inaccurate
information. That node also could refuse to participate
in the level discovery phase, which could eliminate its
children from the network. Since none of the protocols
were designed with security in mind, attacks on the
synchronization are easily executed by following the
rules of the protocol.

Fig.1 MDC collecting the aggregated data from CHs in a
clustered sensor network.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in
Section II we elaborate on related work in detail. We
explain
cluster
formation
and
the
time
synchronization
scheme used in designing the
protocols in section III. In Section IV , we explain
Time Synchronization Protocol
using MDC is
explained in detail in Section. A complete security
analysis of the proposed protocols is discussed in
Section V. Performance analysis of the protocols is
explained in Section VI. Simulation results are
explained in Section VII.We conclude in Section
VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
We classify the related work into two parts first,
we discuss about the concept of
secure data
collection using MDC and the second is the concept
of secure time synchronization.
First concept is secure data collection using MDC,
The MDC-based data collection is studied thoroughly
in the literature in the context of various mobility
models. However, the security aspect in MDC-based
data collection is not studied in detail. In [3] key
management for secure communication and data
collection in distributed WSN is discussed. The
scheme ensures only confidentiality of the collected
data. Identifying malicious MDC and attacks caused
by malicious MDC are not considered. In [8], mobile
sink is used for secure data collection. Here a fixed
path is used by the mobile sink and only the nodes in
this path will be able to communicate with the mobile
sink and transfer data. The nodes in the path are
overloaded with data transfer function every time a
mobile sink visits the nodes for data collection. Also,
deterministic path used by MDC leads to various
attacks.
Second concept is Secure time synchronization,
The primary functionality of wireless sensor networks

III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section first we explain cluster formation
and time synchronization.
A.Cluster Formation
The information preloaded to CH-sensors and SNsensors before deployment are :
• Each node is preloaded with secret key ki that it
shares with the BS for confidential communication
and secret key ki shared between the node and its CH.
• Each CH-sensor is preloaded with private key ki of
all the SN-sensors in the network.
Following are some of the notations used in the paper
:
BS → Base Station
CH → Cluster Head
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CCHK → Common Cluster Head Key
Si →ith Sensor node
CK →Cluster Key
ki →Private key of the ith sensor node
SKi → Session key assigned to Mobile agent for the
ith
round.
TSi → Time stamp assigned to mobile agent for the ith
round.
MAC→ Message Authentication Code.

δ+d. Node A can now calculate the clock offset and
the end-to-end delay as:
δ = ((T2- T1)-( T4- T3))/2; d=((T2- T1)+( T4- T3))/2.
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
We are proposed a concept of secure time
synchronization using MDC in clustered WSN, By
using proposed method MDC authenticated to CH
by computing shared secret keys on the fly. Once the
MDC and CH are authenticated, all the sensor nodes
in the cluster are synchronized, after time
synchronization CH transfer aggregated data to
MDC. Time synchronization prevents external
attackers from successfully modifying any values in
synchronization pulse or in acknowledgement packet,
finally show that this protocol is resilient to attacks
from external attacker as well as to attacks from a
compromised MDC.
A.Time
synchronization using
Mobile Data
Collector in clustered wireless network
In this section, we discuss a simple time
synchronization scheme to identify the malicious
MDC and
the tree based key management
scheme[12]. Our scheme not only identifies the
malicious MDC, reply attack as well as pulse delay
attack. BS selects a session key Ski for the ith round
of MDC and constructs a message { SKi || TSi}CCHK ||
h(SKi ) || IDMDC. Before deployment MDC is preloaded
with session key and the message. Here CCHK is the
common cluster head key which is shared by all the
cluster heads and the base station, SKi is the session
key and TSi is the time stamp assigned to MDC for
the ith round. Here time stamp TSi corresponds to
current time, we assume that the clock value of all
CH’s and BS are synchronized. Also every CH
maintains a table in which it stores information
regarding the TSi along with unique ID of mobile data
collector IDMDC.
Algorithm1.1. explains mechanism which identifies
malicious MDC, reply as replay messages. The
Common Cluster Head Key CCHK is known only to
the CH’s, therefore only an authorized CH is able to
authenticate MDC. The time stamp associated with
the message enables CH to identify the replay
messages. Pulse delay attacks are detected through a
comparison of the computed message end-to-end
delay, d, with the maximal expected message delay
d*. In this protocol, CH initiates the time
synchronization (step 5) to which the rest of the
cluster members reply with messages containing
their ids and

After deployment, clusters are formed using the
preloaded information. We assume that after
deployment, all the nodes are localized and know
their respective positions in the network. Cluster
formation is explained with the help of following
steps.
1) CH-sensors broadcast hello message :
CH → U : IDCH || POSCH || hello
2) Upon receiving hello message from CH’s, each
SN-sensor decides which CH to select based on
POSCH.
3) Let jth CH is nearer to node Si.
4) Now node Si sends the join request to CHj:
Si → CHj : IDSi || h(ki) || ki
Nonce || join.
5) CH-sensors verifies the join request using ki and if
the node Si is authorized, accepts it as one of the
cluster member.
6) CH sends the confirm message to node Si
CH → Si : IDCH || h(Nonce) || confirm.
7) After receiving join request from nearest SNsensors, CH sends the confirm message. Now, CH
retains the information of SN-sensors in its cluster
and erases the rest from its memory.
B. Time synchronization
This protocol executed in three steps as follows
1. A(T1) → (T2)B: A, B, sync
i.e., We use the following notation throughout this
paper.
Node-id (Send time) → (Receive time) Node-id :
Packet contents.
2. B(T3) → (T4)A : B, A, T2, T3, ack
3. A calculates offset between the nodes.
Here, T1, T4 represent the time measured by the
local clock of node A, CA. Similarly T2, T3 represent
the time measured by CB. At time T1, A sends a
synchronization pulse packet to B. Node B receives
this packet at T2, where T2 is equal to T1+δ+d. Here,
δ and d represent the offset between the two nodes
and end-to-end delay respectively. At time T3, B
sends back an acknowledgement packet. This packet
contains the values of T2 and T3. Node A receives the
packet at T4. Similarly, T4 is related to T3 as T4 =T3-

Algorithm 1. Identification of malicious Mobile Data Collector
Replay messages, pulse delay attack in time synchronization
protocol.
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containing the receipt time of the challenge packet
from Si(Til), the nonce of Si and the node -id of Si
respectively. It also contains N MACs, one for each
(CH, Si) pair, which enable each node Si to
authenticate the packet broadcast by CH. In the last
protocol step S1,...,SN synchronize to CH.
By using above algorithm MDC is authenticated
with CH, all the sensor nodes in cluster and CH are
synchronized, Once they synchronized CH transfer
the aggregated data to MDC. Before transferring the
data CH encrypts the data using its secret key Pki such
that only the base station is able to decrypt the data. If
MDC is compromised the collected data is not
exposed as it is in encrypted form. Using the same
secret key to encrypt the data every time may result in
cryptanalysis of the corresponding key. To overcome
this problem secret key Pki of the CH’s are refreshed
at regular interval. Every time CCHK is changed, Pki
is changed to Pki ` using simple transformation
function which can be executed both at the node and
the base station.The transformation used to change
the private key is : Pki `
F (Pki ,CCHK`),
where F is a collision resistant one way function.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze security of the proposed
protocol.
Mainly we consider the following security issues for
time synchronization.




Identifying malicious nodes acting as MDC.
Identifying replay messages.
Node Compromise.
- Compromise of MDC.
- Compromise of CH.
.
 Message manipulation attack.
 Reply attack.
 Pulse Delay attack.
A. Identifying malicious nodes acting as MDC
Malicious MDC is capable of launching various
attacks, all the attacks launched by malicious MDC
considered in this paper are passive attacks. The
adversary try to collect the data from legitimate CH’s
using the recorded messages. By using Time stamp
for identifying malicious MDC we can identify such
malicious MDC to counter the attacks. Information a
malicious MDC gets by eavesdropping is the beacon
message IDMDC || { Ski || TSi }CCHK || h(Ski ). The
message is encrypted by CCHK which is known only
to CH and BS. Hence malicious MDC can not
decrypt the message. By forwarding the message to
CH, malicious MDC fails to authenticate itself as Ski
used in authentication phase is not known to
malicious MDC. Therefore, the authentication
protocol presented in algorithm1. ensures that only
legitimate MDC is able to complete the
authentication phase.

challenge nonce’s (step 6). In step 7 of the protocol,
CH replies with a single broadcast message to all
sensor nodes, containing MACs of the challenges and
node ids. Note that the last protocol message (step 7)
contains N triples {Til, Ni, Si}, one for each Si,
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B. Identifying replay messages
The adversary captures the beacon message and
replay; the message to authenticate itself. The
proposed protocol identify such
replay
messages,
the time stamps associated with
the beacon
message and the previous time stamps
stored in CH enables a CH to identify replay
messages.

D. Message manipulation attack
In this attack, an malicious MDC may drop,
modify, or even forge the exchanged messages to
interrupt the communication process. To perform this
attack an malicious MDC needs to take part in the
message communication. To this end, it is necessary
to be a valid MDC in the network. In our protocol, an
malicious MDC cannot forge the path or packet.
Thus, this attack is not effective with this protocol.

C. Node Compromise
Node compromise is one of the important attack to
be considered in WSN. We consider node
compromise with respect to CH-sensor and MDC as
these two are the attractive targets for an adversary.

E. Reply attack
In our proposed protocol, an malicious MDC
cannot pass the authentication process. Even if a
malicious MDC makes a copy of the previous TSi, it
still cannot forge the session as TSi is updated every
time the message is broadcasted.

1) Compromise of MDC : We describe
what is the impact of MDC
compromise on the collected
data
with
respect
to the proposed
protocols. The analysis is based on the
information an adversary gets by
compromising a MDC.
• Collected Data : The CH encrypts the
aggregated data using
secret key Pki
before transferring the data to MDC.
The secret key Pki is known only to
CH and BS. Also the secret key Pki is
changed at regular interval. Therefore
the compromised MDC will not reveal
any
data
to
an
adversary.
• Beacon Message : The beacon
message consists of information
required to authenticate
MDC.
The beacon message do not reveal any
information about the secret key Pki
which is used to
encrypt
the
collected
data.
• Session key Ski : Using the session
key Ski
the adversary may try to
get data from a CH that has not yet
transferred its data. As the data is
encrypted using Pki it is not possible
for an adversary to forge
the data.
Hence the protocol is resilient to
compromise of MDC.
2) Compromise of CH-sensor
Now adversary is able to compromise more
CH’s. In this proposed protocol the beacon
message used to authenticate MDC is
encrypted
using
CCHK.
Therefore
compromise of CH-sensor enables an
adversary to compromise MDC and collect
data from other CH-sensors.

F. Pulse Delay attack
After cluster formation in WSNs, nodes are
authenticated by a hierarchy level corresponding to
their cluster heads as well as to the base station. Thus,
no malicious can disguise as a legitimate in the
network. For successfully executing the delay attack
on the network, an malicious node needs to capture
the timing message, intentionally delay it, and later
send it to the node. Hence, if an malicious node
captures the timing message and intentionally delays
it only to later pass it on to the node, it will be
automatically discarded by the node as this timing
message has already reached the node through a
legitimate node. Furthermore, each timing message
is different from one another by its Sequence# and
TSi. As a result, the delay attack is not effective
against our proposed protocol.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the proposed protocols
with respect to communication, computation, storage
required for time synchronization.
A. Storage
Here we study the amount of storage required to
store cryptographic secrets used for authentication
and encryption of the data. The storage with respect
to SN-sensor, CH-sensor and MDC are discussed for
the proposed protocol.
• SN-Sensor : All the keys along the path of the tree
for which the SN-sensor belongs to are stored in SNsensors. The number of keys of the tree each SNsensor stores are logmn + 1 for a cluster of size n and
degree of the tree m. In addition to this each SNsensor stores secret key Pki used for confidential
communication with the BS.
•CH-Sensor : The CH-sensor maintains m array tree
consisting of all the SN-sensors in the cluster.
Therefore storage required to maintain the tree is (
m/m−1 )n. All CH’s form a m array tree maintained
by BS. Each CH-sensor stores all the logmn+1 keys

Fig.2.time line representing secure and vulnerable
communication when a CH-sensor is compramised for Time
stamp method.
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along the path of this tree. Also each CH-sensor
stores its secret key Pki
for confidential
communication with the BS.
• MDC : MDC stores the session key Ski and the
beacon message IDMDC|| { SKi || TSi}CCHK || h(ki ).
B. Communication
The Communication cost is measured in terms of
number of messages exchanged between a CH and
the MDC to complete authentication In this protocol a
total of six messages are exchanged between a CH
and the MDC for authentication and time
synchronization.
After
authentication,
time
synchronization message is transferred to all sensors
in the cluster and
are synchronized. After
synchronization , single unicast message CH transfers
the encrypted data and the same is received by the
MDC.

Fig3(a). End-to-End delay of CH for different rounds of MDC
visits in Proposed protocol.

C. Computation
The computation cost is measured in terms of
various operations that are performed to authenticate
MDC and to time synchronize nodes . The protocol
performs only encryption/decryption operations and
one way hash functions to authenticate MDC and
then time synchronization packet is sent to CH after
time synchronization. Here CH-sensor performs one
encryption and one decryption operations and a single
hash function to authenticate MDC. To transfer data
CH performs single encryption operation. The
computations at MDC are one encryption and one
decryption for authentication. Time stamping the
packets ensures that the transmission delay is
symmetric for the data exchange between MDC-CH
and prevent the reply attack, minimizes the
synchronization precision and maximize the attacker
impact.

Fig.3(b)
MDC.

Synchronization error over different rounds of

VIII. CONCLUSION
The secure time synchronization and data
collection in clustered WSN using MDC is not
explored in detail in the literature. Almost all of the
existing time synchronization protocols are
vulnerable to different attacks and communication
and computation costs are very high in terms of
resource constrained WSN. By using proposed
method MDC authenticated to CH by computing
shared secret keys on the fly. Once the MDC and CH
are authenticated, all the sensor nodes in the cluster
are synchronized, after time synchronization CH
transfer aggregated data to MDC. By using proposed
method we can resist various attacks such as
compromised CH, compromised MDC, reply attack,
message manipulation attack and pulse delay attack.
The analysis shows that proposed method provide
varying level of security against node compromise
attack, pulse delay attack by imposing addition
computational overhead. We believe that we have just
scratched the surface in the solution space of secure
time synchronization and data collection in clustered
WSN. Our future work includes investigation of
various time synchronization schemes using MDC in
clustered WSN, In parallel we are also developing
better remedial actions against the malicious attacks.

VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations were conducted to study the end-toend delay of the proposed protocol. The proposed
protocol is simulated, where we recorded the end-to
end delay of the nodes on round basis. The end-toend delay shown in the simulations is for entire one
round of the MDC including authentication, data
transfer and time synchronization at each node.
For our experiments we considered 10% of the
nodes as CHs,for different sized network a same
percentage of CHs is considered. The delay analysis
and synchronization error for the proposed protocol
are shown in Fig.3(a),(b), respectively.
The graphs represents end- to-end delay analysis
for the different rounds. If we observe the pattern of
delay for varying cluster size, it reveals new things.
Intensifies when there are more nodes in the network
and these computations are higher. Thus additional
security provided by proposed protocol requires
higher delay. Therefore there is a trade-off between
delay and level of security being provided.
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